Updating the Official Gospel: Canadian Military History’s Third Wave by Windsor, Lee
1 Col. C.P. Stacey, Official History of the Second World War: Volume I, Six Years of War, The Army
in Canada, Britain, and the Pacific (Ottawa, 1957); Lt-Col. G.W.L. Nicholson, Official History of the
Second World War: Volume II, The Canadians in Italy, 1943-1945 (Ottawa, 1956); Col. C.P. Stacey,
Official History of the Second World War: Volume III, The Victory Campaign, Operations in
Northwest Europe, 1944-45 (Ottawa, 1960); Lt-Col. G.W.L Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary
Force: 1914-1919 (Ottawa, 1962); Lt-Col. H.F. Wood, Strange Battleground: The Operations in
Korea and Their Effects on the Defence Policy of Canada (Ottawa, 1966).
Updating the Official Gospel:
Canadian Military History’s Third Wave
HISTORICAL WRITING ABOUT THE ARMIES Canada fielded in two world wars
and Korea is in the midst of a third wave. It began in the mid-1990s around the time
that 50th-anniversary celebrations of the Battle of Normandy and the liberation of
Europe renewed popular and academic interest in the subject. This essay explores
three landmark works constituting some of the best writing in this group: Terry
Copp’s Fields of Fire: The Canadians in Normandy (Toronto, University of Toronto
Press, 2003); Tim Cook’s No Place to Run: The Canadian Corps and Gas Warfare in
the First World War (Vancouver, UBC Press, 1999) and William Johnston’s A War
of Patrols: Canadian Army Operations in Korea (Vancouver, UBC Press, 2003).
What distinguishes these third-wave scholars are their efforts to reopen the question
of what happened when Canada’s ground forces arrived on the battlefield.
Despite preliminary work done in the 1920s and 1930s on an official series of
volumes concerning Canada in the Great War, the first significant wave of historical
writing about Canada’s wartime past began immediately after the Second World War,
led by Charles P. Stacey, a civilian historian made chief of the Army General Staff’s
Historical Section. In the 1950s and the 1960s, this organization produced the Official
History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War, widely touted then, as now,
as the definitive works on Canada’s ground forces in battle.  These works represented
a monumental effort on the part of dozens of historical officers gathering documents
and interviews with participants to produce a masterful three-volume narrative of
Canada’s experience in the 1939 to 1945 war. The momentum and interest generated
by this project led to two more monographs, a single volume on the Great War
Canadian Expeditionary Force and another on Canada’s role in Korea.1 These five
volumes form the core of what could be called the first wave of Canadian military
history. True to the standards of the day, the official volumes offered a traditional,
top-down account of Canada’s military forces in action. Decisions and plans of senior
commanders provided the framework and focus for as much critical analysis as was
possible in a time when many of those commanders held powerful positions in the
postwar army. In keeping with this focus on leadership and a mandate to include all
Canadian battles in the narrative, examination of the minutia of combat was
necessarily limited. Given spacial restrictions, rarely was it possible for the official
account to proceed below discussions of 4000-man brigades or 800-man battalions.
Such was the domain of regimental histories produced by unit associations across the
country. These latter works vary greatly in historical value, depending on the author.
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They range from virtual unit scrapbooks prepared by former members to excellent
monographs prepared by professional scholars like Reginald Roy, Will Bird and, most
recently, Donald Graves.2 These works are filled with important details from
interviews and otherwise unavailable documentary evidence, making them eminently
useful. However, they are obviously limited in scope to specific units.
A second discernable wave of historical writing appeared in the later stages of the
Cold War. Using the official histories as the battlefield gospel, this group of historians
focussed either on adding colour to accounts of battle and wartime life or adding depth
concerning external economic, social and political factors that influenced the
battlefield.3 A second, smaller group, which included contemporary military
practitioners, concentrated on evaluating Canadian army leadership in the Second
World War. Some in the first group, influenced by trends in social and popular
history, explored the impact of command decisions on individuals at the “sharp end”
who held little capacity to influence events.4 The latter grew from professional
military interest in command decision-making at a time when the possibility of a
conventional Third World War inspired a body of didactic history aimed at avoiding
mistakes made in previous wars.5 Neither body of writing sought to challenge the
official histories’ narrative of battle, and instead magnified the Historical Section’s
subtle critique that public and government defence indifference in the years before
Canada’s three 20th-century wars cost the nation dearly when eager but untrained
“citizen-soldiers” lurched into battle led by equally unprepared generals. Historians
writing during this time made significant contributions to our knowledge of matters
influencing events on the battlefield, but few were prepared to significantly revise
what Canadians understood about what happened on the battlefield.
As the Cold War faded into the past in the 1990s, a third wave of outstanding
scholarly writing on Canada at war materialized amidst a veritable flood of popular
publications. This wave capitalizes on recent trends in social and cultural history
emphasizing comprehensively detailed case studies to assemble as complete a picture
as possible of life within an historical event or period for ordinary people. In military
history, this means creating a clear picture of what happens in combat when private
soldiers, led by sergeants and junior officers, set to putting their generals’ plan into
effect. The task is indeed possible, if time consuming, for Canada’s three major 20th-
century wars represent some of the most richly documented events in the country’s
history.
Documentary evidence utilized by this wave includes traditional correspondence
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4 See Desmond Morton, When Your Number’s Up (Toronto, 1993) and Dan Dancocks, Legacy of
Valour (Edmonton, 1986).
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and planning papers of commanders; but, more importantly, small-unit after-action
reports, radio transmission logs and administrative statistics are mined with a
quantative thoroughness associated with social history and not generally possible in
the broad, official histories. These sources are combined with a more creative
utilization of letters, diaries, scrapbooks, unit newspapers, art, poetry, songs and,
when possible, interviews to understand how soldiers perceived themselves and their
surroundings as well as to test old assumptions about how Canada responded to the
challenge of war.
Nowhere is this phenomenon more evident than in the ground-breaking new study
Fields of Fire: The Canadians in Normandy by Terry Copp. Copp is a long-time
Professor of History at Wilfrid Laurier University and a well-known activist on behalf
of veterans and for the preservation of Canadian military historic sites through the
Canadian Battlefields Foundation. Those not familiar with his scholarly achievements
should know Fields of Fire is much more than a 267-page monograph. It is the
fruition of twenty years of research into what he calls the “fine-grain details” of what
happened when Canadian units entered combat in Normandy. Reflected in the pages
and footnotes of Fields of Fire is Copp’s time spent with the documents, veterans and
on the battlefields giving him an intimate knowledge of Canadian personalities at all
levels of command, the tactical, operational, strategic and psychological
circumstances behind decisions and events, and, most importantly, how the terrain
over which Canadian battles took place shaped the course of events. His history of
combat is strengthened by including the latest research into cultural and social
questions concerning Canada at war, including sport, motivation, off-duty social
activity, the proportionality of sacrifice, battle exhaustion and leadership structures.
The study also considers training, development and the professionalization of the
Canadian army during its long waiting period in England. Copp argues that although
there was significant room for improvement, the members of the Canadian army made
far better use of their time in the United Kingdom preparing themselves for war than
the established interpretation suggests.
Copp’s narrative of the Canadian army in Normandy is at once a supplement to the
broader strokes of Stacey’s Victory Campaign as well as a challenge to many of
Stacey’s conclusions. Copp’s principle argument is straightforward: “The
achievement of the Allied, and especially the Canadian armies in Normandy has been
greatly underrated, while the effectiveness of the German Army has been greatly
exaggerated”( p. 13). To those who suggest the Allies only succeeded against a more
skilful German opponent by resorting to overwhelming numbers and material
employed in an unimaginative manner, Copp counters that these advantages are vastly
overstated, especially considering that the Germans most often held the more
significant advantage of defending dug-in positions. In such circumstances, Copp
contends, Normandy “was a victory won primarily by Allied soldiers employing
flexible and innovative operational and tactical solutions to the challenges confronting
them”( p.13).
Central to Copp’s argument is the question of the relative strength of the opposing
forces. His battlefield evidence reveals that the Allies, particularly in the British- and
Canadian-manned eastern end of the Normandy bridgehead, never held the 3:1
numerical superiority ratio demanded by staff college textbooks for a successful
attack against prepared defences. Allied planners anticipated this and therefore
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developed an artillery-based doctrine intended to take advantage of known German
tendencies to man their front with a portion of their forces while holding back the
remainder for immediate counter-attacks on Allied penetrations, just as they had done
in the last war. Equally similar to their own proven tactics of 1918, Anglo-Canadian
doctrine centred on the “bite and hold” principle. These tactics used predictable
artillery barrages to force Germans underground while Allied infantry rushed forward
to arrive amid enemy positions the moment the shelling lifted. Instead of advancing
deeper after killing or capturing the defenders, the next Allied step called for
assaulting troops to dig in, to select good fire positions for automatic weapons,
mortars and anti-tank guns, and to choose the best viewing points for artillery-forward
observations officers. When the inevitable enemy counter-attack materialized,
German soldiers faced the tactical disadvantage of exposing themselves and their
vehicles as they advanced into prepared killing zones. While not glamourous, this
method proved highly effective at achieving the Allies’ stated strategic goal of
destroying the German army. General Montgomery emphasized that “we must engage
the enemy in battle unceasingly; we must ‘write off’ his troops; and generally we must
kill Germans” (p. 187). Neither this goal nor the Anglo-Canadian method for
achieving it figures in the established Canadian interpretation of Normandy.
Copp argues that heavy Anglo-Canadian reliance on artillery did not stifle tactical
flexibility as the majority of commentators suggest. Sound pre-invasion tactical
training and the flexibility born of an incomplete doctrinal development process
provided commanders with an intellectual toolbox for solving the tactical problems.
The proof for these bold statements emerges from Copp’s narrative. To begin with, he
illustrates that pre-landing firepower hurled at German beach defences was
ineffective. Canadian infantrymen and supporting tanks and engineers were thus left
to fight their way through those defences using basic small-unit fire and movement
tactics of which other commentators claimed they were not capable.
The validity of the Allied artillery-based doctrine for handling the famous German
mobile formations proved itself in the days immediately after 6 June. Much of the
German army’s infantry and tank strength was bled away in costly counter-attacks
against well-prepared fortress positions like the one manned by 7th Canadian Infantry
Brigade during their little-known defence of Bretteville-l’Orgueilleuse and Norrey-
en-Bessin. Copp’s account demonstrates that every weapon in the Canadian army
inventory was put to use not just to “repel” counter-attacks, but to kill the counter-
attackers. This included all weapons available to frontline infantrymen that others
suggest were rarely employed. Copp’s interpretation of these decisive, early-June
battles sheds light on the decision made by 2nd British Army commander, Miles
Dempsey, to limit the depth of his D-Day advances. Copp’s evidence establishes a
solid case that halting early to prepare defences on chosen ground better facilitated
Allied aims of destroying their enemy at sustainable cost to themselves than would
meeting German Panzer divisions on the move.
Critical to Copp’s interpretation are Allied intelligence reports containing
information taken out of “Ultra” signals decrypted from German “enigma” coding
machine transmissions. These reports provided Allied commanders with details, if not
always consistently, about enemy strength, dispositions and intentions; significantly,
they remained classified when the army official histories were written. The degree to
which Fields of Fire and other recent studies demonstrate that Allied planning and
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decision-making was based upon exploiting Ultra intelligence is alone a justification
for updating the official narrative.6 Copp’s combination of Ultra intelligence and a
bottom-up approach to combat also yields new conclusions about Canadian battles
south of Caen on the road to Falaise. Copp uses Ultra decrypts to add Allied and
German strategic context to these events which are all-too-often approached in a
tactical vacuum consisting only of Canadians and small SS Panzer battlegroups. He
explodes the conventional wisdom that the 2nd Canadian Corps and then the First
Canadian Army were unable to defeat an inferior enemy due to weak leadership,
initiative and motivation. Instead, he argues that operations like Spring and Totalize
were conceived not as breakthrough attempts but as holding attacks on the eastern end
of the bridgehead where Ultra revealed the Germans most feared a breakthrough. This
pressure was intended to draw German attention away from large American breakout
forces on the western end and from British supporting attacks in the centre. Copp
reveals that the price paid so that Patton’s Army could breakout into the undefended
French countryside was that Canadian soldiers with limited resources and dangerous
manpower shortages had to fight and die pressing against the most powerful German
positions in Normandy. In these circumstances, Copp finds more success than failure
because Canadian units convinced German commanders that a threat to Falaise
existed out of proportion to actual Allied strength committed there.
Historians misinterpret this diversionary success because several elite Panzer
formations were able to disengage and move west for the suicidal Mortain counter-
offensive. Copp demonstrates that this shift does not reflect diminished German
concern about the possibility of a Canadian breakthrough. Instead, fresh, fully manned
infantry divisions, previously held in the Pas de Calais by Allied ruse, were fed into
the line opposite exhausted Canadian formations. Yet not only did the Canadians
manage to smash these new divisions, they also prevented the full disengagement of
German armour for Mortain. Most histories of the fighting south of Caen fail to
mention these fresh divisions. Instead they fixate on the second and third stages of
operations when the advance is slowed by Panzer battlegroups hurled back into the
line by anxious German commanders to repair gaping holes torn by the Canadians.
Even then, historians select examples of battlegroups catching Canadian units on the
move or of sensational errors such as the disaster which befell the British Columbia
Regiment when it became lost on route to Point 195. They seem to avoid the more
frequent examples of German counter-attacks being shot up with great loss after
driving into prepared Canadian killing zones.
To his open vindication of Canadian combat effectiveness during the fighting north
of Falaise, Copp adds guarded criticism of General Montgomery’s handling of the
battle.  He argues that Montgomery failed, for some reason, to reinforce the Canadian
drive on Falaise or to provide the First Canadian Army with clear instructions when
it became evident that German forces remaining in Normandy were being encircled in
6 In the latest naval official history volume, the Department of National Defence Directorate of History
and Heritage notes the work was deliberately delayed until such time as Ultra decrypts became
available because they were deemed essential to understanding how Allied and Canadian operations
were conceptualized. See W.A.B. Douglas, Roger Sarty and Michael Whitby, No Higher Purpose:
The Official Operational History of the Royal Canadian Navy in the Second World War, 1939-1943,
Volume II, Part I (St. Catherines, 2002), p. xvii.
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a great pocket in August 1944. This decision once again condemned the First
Canadian Army to attempt an impossible drive, with insufficient forces, through the
only intact German defence line left in Normandy. The result was that some of the
trapped Germans escaped and the reputation of Canada’s army was forever tarnished.
Copp’s account of decisions in American, British and Canadian headquarters and of
the circumstances leading up to the final sealing off of the Gap on 21st August is the
most thorough to date, clarifying that Canadian commanders do bear some
responsibility. Yet Copp concludes that more important questions remain unanswered
about both Montgomery’s apparent desire to spare the Second British Army for
pursuit operations at the expense of Canadians at Falaise and US General Omar
Bradley’s contradictory justifications for his decision not to close the Gap from the
south. What is clear is that, under these circumstances, closing the Falaise Gap was
impossible for there were not enough Canadian and Polish soldiers in the vicinity to
form a continuous defence line to block it. Furthermore, Copp demonstrates that those
Canadians and Poles who fought their way into crucial choke points at the edges and
in the middle of the Gap, and then held them as a sea of desperate German soldiers
threatened to overwhelm them from two sides, deserve admiration rather than the
condemnation received thus far from historians.
Copp does not purport to suggest that the Canadian army in Normandy was beyond
reproach. Indeed, Fields of Fire identifies its share of problems within Canadian and
Allied forces; however, Copp’s commitment to understanding why events occur and
why decisions are taken means that those problems are often explicable, if not always
forgivable, given the circumstances and information available at the time. Copp
argues that Col. Stacey’s official interpretation – that the British and Canadian
generalship in Normandy was superb despite inadequacies among Canadian soldiers
and junior leaders – is in need of revision. Copp finds that British and Canadian senior
leadership was at best satisfactory, and that victory was won primarily because of the
strength and skill of soldiers and junior leaders. That Canadian units “suffered
considerably heavier casualties than other divisions in 21 Army Group” was not the
result of insufficient training and poor leadership but “the product of a greater number
of days in close combat with the enemy”, most of which were spent in diversionary
operations against the best of the German army so that others could secure the glory.
It is for these reasons that Copp contends “The Canadian citizen army that fought in
the Battle of Normandy played a role all out of proportion to its relative strength
among the Allied Armies” (p. 267).
It is not surprising that in Canada and Great Britain, where similar official
narratives lauding the generalship still predominate, reviewers savaged Copp’s work.7
However, many shortcomings reviewers found in Fields of Fire are more akin to an
unwillingness to accept Copp’s evidence and conclusions rather than actual problems
with the book. Most tellingly, American military historians, whose research is also
finding flaws in mainstream interpretations of the war, recently honoured Fields of
Fire with the Society for Military History’s 2004 Distinguished Book Award for Non-
7 See, for example, Brian Reid, review of Fields of Fire by Terry Copp, in The Army Doctrine and
Training Bulletin, 6, 3 (Fall/Winter 2003), pp. 66-71 and Donald E. Graves, review of Field of Fire
by Tery Copps, in Canadian Military Journal, 4, 3 (Autumn 2003), pp. 65-7.
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US Military History. Most likely, critical Canadian reviews are an indicator that Copp
is succeeding in his goal of shaking the foundations of established Canadian military
history and changing the paradigm through which we construe the Second World
War.
The 1939-45 conflagration is not the only war historians are asking new questions
about. The nation’s Great War experience remains a focal point for cutting-edge
research which again finds gaps in the official histories. In No Place to Run: The
Canadian Corps and Gas Warfare in the First World War, Canadian War Museum
historian Tim Cook reveals that poison gas was a significant feature in every battle on
the Western Front after 1915, yet its presence is missing from the historical record.
Partly because of post-war revulsion at the use of gas, fears that it would be a major
weapon in future wars and misunderstandings about its employment and utility, Cook
finds few references to chemical warfare in British and especially Canadian literature.
The one exception is the legendary stand by 1st Canadian Division in the 2nd Battle
of Ypres against the German army’s first use of chlorine gas. Cook sifts through the
terrifying details of this battle to expose that the heroic defence that spawned the
Canadian Corps’ fearsome reputation was based not merely on unshakable resolve,
but on the confidence soldiers placed in their officers. Thus, when junior field
commanders with chemistry backgrounds recognized signs of chlorine and ordered
their men to breath through urine-soaked handkerchiefs, most men did as they were
told.
Ironically, this first and last significant appearance of gas in the Great War
narrative exemplified characteristics in the Canadian Corps that enabled it to function
ever more effectively as the war went on, despite the fact that, with each battle, gas
increased in lethality. Central to this story is the formation and development of a
largely unknown unit formed first to defend against gas attacks, and then to employ
chemical weapons against the enemy. “The Canadian way of war was steeped in
poison gas”, Cook argues. “The Canadian Corps Gas Services grew in stature as the
gas war progressed in deadliness, intensity and frequency. Combining education and
drill, Gas Services played a key role in forcing the troops of the Canadian Corps to
follow strict anti-gas guidelines that saved thousands of lives and strengthened the
corps’ fighting efficiency” (p. 211).
Cook’s study builds on the work of Bill Rawling and others who reject the
mythology that the Great War was a case of “Lions led by Donkeys” where the flower
of western youth was carelessly squandered by unimaginative generals unable to
break the trench deadlock; Cook argues, instead, that a gradual British and
Commonwealth tactical and technological learning process produced a doctrine not
only to break out of the trenches but to defeat the German army on the battlefield.8
This group of historians also suggests the Canadian Corps adapted to the new
battlefield quicker than British corps mainly because the Canadians remained
homogeneous. In contrast, the British corps continually interchanged component
formations preventing them from acquiring familiarity and trust, or from drawing on
8 Bill Rawling, Surviving Trench Warfare: Technology and the Canadian Corps, 1914-1918 (Toronto,
1992); see also Shane Schreiber, Shock Army of the British Empire: The Canadian Corps in the Last
100 Days of the Great War (Westport, 1997).
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collective experiences to develop common procedures and training methods.
Cook joins this debate by divulging how Canadian Corps Gas Services contributed
to that learning curve and benefited from homogeneity. The Canadians, Cook
suggests, “were wary of how gas had already been successfully used against them, and
recognizing their unique organization in the more stable Canadian Corps as compared
to their British Counterparts, were able to instigate fundamental changes quicker than
the rest of the BEF” (p. 122). This included appointing gas officers to coordinate
measures to provide early warning of gas attacks, decontamination in the aftermath
and, most importantly, training soldiers how to survive this new enemy with
knowledge and good gas discipline. The corps also developed a gas school to train
field commanders. As Cook states, “The goal [of Gas Services] was to impart a
realistic understanding of what could be confronted at the front, control a possible
epidemic of gas casualties, and ease fears of all soldiers regarding the expanding gas
war by developing an active defence against it” (p. 117). Cook makes use of cultural
sources, especially soldiers’ letters and diaries, to measure the success of these efforts.
Interestingly, much like Jonathan Vance’s Death So Noble, Cook finds that the
common Canadian soldier’s perception of gas, like the war in general, differs from
images portrayed in the anti-war literature of the 1920s and 1930s.9 Cook argues that
Canadian Gas Services training, education and defence programs transformed gas
from a terror weapon into just another trench peril to be avoided with vigilance and
good discipline, albeit one that provoked constant fear and fatigue.
In order to conquer the effects of gas warfare, Canadian and British Gas Services
had to remain ever vigilant to new threats. It was the Germans, with their superior pre-
war chemical industry and willingness to accept international shame for being the first
to use each successively deadlier gas, who held the initiative in the gas war. From
their first fumbling use of chlorine released from buried cylinders through to the
employment of gas shells and finally to the development of the vile, lingering, slow
killer that was mustard gas, the Allies were always on the alert to new types of
German gases and methods of employing them. The Canadian Corps Gas School
played a particularly important role in rapidly disseminating information about new
gases and how to defend against them, thus helping curtail the inevitable and
potentially demoralizing rumours that arose with the introduction of each new
German gas weapon or tactic.
Cook reflects the third wave of Canadian military history because he is not content
to establish his argument about the extensive nature of gas warfare and rest it on a few
select examples. Instead he writes gas into the Canadian operational narrative, from
the first usage during the 2nd Battle for Ypres in 1915, through the Somme in 1916,
Vimy and Passchendaele in 1917 right up to the peak of gas warfare in the German
1918 Spring Offensive and the highly successful Canadian attacks of the Last
Hundred Days. Like Copp, it is from Cook’s study of the role of gas in every
Canadian/Allied and German engagement that his principal findings emerge: gas was
integral to Canada’s Great War experience, both as an enemy weapon to be defended
against and as a useful tool in the Canadian artillery inventory. Prior to publication of
No Place to Run, few were probably aware of the extensive use of both Canadian gas
9 Jonathan F. Vance, Death So Noble: Memory, Meaning, and the First World War (Vancouver, 1997).
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shells and captured German gas shells in breaking up counter-attacks on Vimy Ridge
in April 1917; nor was it common knowledge that Canadians faced mass quantities of
mustard gas as they clung tenaciously to Hill 70 or that the Germans used a variety of
gasses to force Canadians at Passchendaele to wear their gas masks for prolonged
periods in order to exhaust them physically and mentally. Cook informs the reader
that combinations of irritant and deadly gasses in enormous quantities were the core
of the great German Spring Offensive of 1918 that ripped out the centre of the British
front and caused panic in Allied Headquarters.
By the end of 1917 gas was so essential and widespread in use in Canadian Corps’
operations that control passed from Gas Services specialists directly to the Royal
Canadian Artillery who integrated gas shell bombardments into routine fire plans. In
particular, gas was employed in “counter-battery” shoots to saturate German artillery
positions, limiting their capacity to respond to Canadian infantry advancing in the
open. Gas shell concentrations would again be used in conjunction with traditional
high-explosive shells to break up German counter-attacks. Cook states “Gas worked
most effectively as part of a system of weapons . . . [w]ith the introduction of gas
shells and the general acceptance by the artillery of their uses, gas became a constant
factor on the Western Front. Although there were no repeats of the panic of April
1915, gas was a valued weapon within the attack doctrine of all armies” (p. 231).
While Canadian soldiers found ways to minimize physical gas casualties, it was in
the psychological realm that this weapon did the most harm. Among Cook’s most
important contributions are his terrifying depictions of how gas made an already
atrocious life in the trenches due to mud, shells, rats and decaying corpses even more
hellish. He argues that this human factor of war is what is most absent from official
histories concerned as they must be with real numbers and tangible operational
results. The problem is particularly evident with regard to gas casualties, which were
extremely difficult to verify.  Soldiers rendered unconscious in the open by gas and
subsequently ripped to pieces in a high-explosive barrage as well as soldiers with non-
lethal bullet or fragment wounds unable to get their masks on before gas clouds
overcame them were likely recorded as casualties of traditional weapons.  
The problem of verification combined with good Canadian gas discipline led many
historians to conclude that despite its initial shock on unprepared units, gas was an
ineffective weapon. Cook cites a typical example of a German gas attack employing
600 canisters over a mile of trench causing only 12 specifically gas casualties. Cook
argues these numbers were not only probably higher, but that the real measure of the
weapon was that “all the men in that area would be affected one way or another. The
repeated disruption of sleep, the fear of having one’s respirator fail, in addition to the
very real discomfort of wearing a respirator and the difficulty of breathing while
carrying out any work were all factors that . . . withdrew from the soldier’s ‘courage
account’” (p. 217). That soldiers could continue to function in the gas environment
with the proficiency they did is a testament to Canadian Gas Services’ efforts and to
the fortitude of the Canadian Corps.
Cook’s and Copp’s identification of the Canadian fighting soldier as a victim of
official history misinterpretation or omission is not exclusive to the First and Second
World Wars. It also applies to what many call Canada’s forgotten war in Korea, the
subject of William Johnston’s important new book. Johnston had an equally difficult
task as Copp in that he set out to deconstruct the narrative established in the 1966
Acadiensis152
11780-09 Windsor Review  8/9/04  3:46 PM  Page 152
Canadian Military History’s Third Wave 153
official history Strange Battleground and subsequently reinforced by more recent
findings by David Bercuson and Brent Watson.10 The consensus was that Canada’s
initial response to a United Nation’s request for ground forces in Korea was a near
disaster. The so-called Special Force raised under Minister of National Defence
Brooke Claxton’s ill-conceived program consisted of hastily recruited 2nd Battalions
of Canada’s three regular infantry regiments, made up allegedly of swashbuckling
“soldier of fortune” types who signed on for 18 months of adventure. The Special
Force was said to be poorly trained, inadequately equipped and badly led and the
Canadian army’s performance in Korea only began to improve in 1952 after the
Special Force rotated home and was replaced by the “professionals” from the
Canadian army’s three regular battalions.
As with Copp, Johnston establishes that this simplistic analysis is based on
incomplete knowledge of what happened in combat, or, for that matter, the
composition of the Special Force. Outside the Battle for Kap’yong, little hard
evidence has ever been offered as to how the first rotation of “soldiers of fortune”
fared, in part due to what Johnston sees as a professional bias on the part of the official
historian, Lieutenant-Colonel H.F. Wood. Wood led the professionalized 3rd
Battalion of the Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry in the third rotation and
wrote an official narrative which conveys “the professional army’s disdain for the
Special Force volunteers”. Discourse on the volunteer first rotation in combat is
conspicuously absent in Wood’s Strange Battleground, while anecdotes about its
unprofessional conduct out of the line are commonplace. According to Johnston,
“Wood gave an official endorsement to the public’s perception that the Special Force
had been a collection of misfit soldiers of fortune, men who were later replaced at the
front by the spit-and-polish professionals of the regular 1st Battalions” (p. xvii). This
negative public image, not unlike that of the Canadian army in the early 1990s, grew
from media reports about the drunken behaviour of a small but highly visible minority
within the Special Force. Johnston suggests that recent literature only reinforces
Wood’s assessment because it provides no context to these reports nor does it measure
the Special Force in combat.
Johnston’s primary goal is to write the virtually non-existent history of the Special
Force as well as to significantly revise existing interpretations of the two subsequent
regular force rotations. He is comprehensive in his account of the formation and
training of the Special Force and each and every combat operation conducted during
the first rotation, from the famous stand at Kap’yong to the endless large and small
patrols conducted to dominate no-man’s-land after the mobile war turned static in
mid-1951.
Contrary to the established interpretation, Johnston contends that the Special Force
was the “most combat-ready force Canada has ever fielded at the outset of a conflict”
(p. xix). This was due to the fact that nearly all of the volunteers for officer and non-
commissioned officer positions in the 2nd Battalions were filled with experienced
Second World War combat veterans. These men shunned the idea of peacetime,
garrison soldiering in the post-nuclear age, but were drawn back to the colours by the
10 David Bercuson, Blood on the Hills (Toronto, 1999); Brent Watson, Far Eastern Tour: The Canadian
Infantry in the Korean War, 1950-1953 (Montreal, 2002).
11780-09 Windsor Review  8/9/04  3:46 PM  Page 153
lure of serving in action. Most importantly of all, Johnston claims, this group included
highly successful and well-motivated former sub-unit and unit commanders (who
took charge of the three Special Force battalions and their component companies),
including well-known names like Jim Stone and Jacques Dextraze. In addition, the
man Claxton asked to lead the Force was none other than the nation’s most famous
brigade commander from the last war, the larger-than-life John M. “Rocky”
Rockingham, hero of Vierreres Ridge in Normandy and Operation Switchback in the
Scheldt. The volunteer privates in what Johnston calls “Rocky’s Army” may not have
had the same experience, but most were keen, fit and eager to listen to and learn from
the knowledge and experience of their sergeants and officers.
In response to recent criticisms that British-style equipment and doctrine were
outdated and ill-suited to Korean conditions, Johnston describes a carefully weighed
decision at Canadian Army Headquarters to capitalize on the veteran junior and senior
leaders’ familiarity with those weapons and tactics to make good the comparatively
short time available to train what became 25th Canadian Brigade. This decision,
Johnston argues, meant the brigade’s training task was less onerous than the hardships
faced by Canadian troops in 1914 and 1939. If anything, Rockingham’s troops were
too keen and well prepared as most of the mischief they caused at a training camp in
Washington State happened after they heard the war might be over before they got
there.  It was this rabble-rousing that contributed to the myth that they were a ragtag
lot of misfits.
The proof of Johnston’s argument and the strength of his work lie in his battle
narrative. It begins with the 2nd Battalion of the Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light
Infantry (2PPCLI), thrust into the line ahead of the rest of the brigade; they were the
first to provide Canadian occupation presence when General Douglas MacArthur
prematurely boasted that the war was nearly won and the first to help stop the surprise
Chinese intervention and counter-offensives. This well-known turn of events set the
stage for the now-legendary 2PPCLI stand on Hill 677 along the Kap’yong River in
central Korea. Johnston’s thorough re-creation and analysis does justice to Canada’s
most famous action of the war by avoiding overstating the achievement. It may be
true, he argues, that the Chinese attack down the Kap’yong Valley was but a diversion
for a renewed drive on Seoul and that the Canadian battalion was backed by strong
fire support and American reinforcements arriving by the hour, but the fact remains
that the Patricia’s stood their ground against a superior enemy force, despite being
encircled on ground that did not permit mutual support between companies. That they
tenaciously clung to their slit trenches, Johnston asserts, was entirely due to the
combat experience and aggressive spirit of the unit’s officers and NCOs. The stand
also occurred at a time when morale in the United Nations Eighth Army was still
suffering after a number of bitter defeats and hasty withdrawals, therefore justifying
the US Presidential Unit Citation awarded to the unit as a symbolic turning point.
However, Kap’yong and the small number of other actions fought by the remainder
of the brigade when it arrived on a still-fluid battlefield represented only a small
portion of the fighting and of Canadian losses suffered in Korea. As the title of
Johnston’s book suggests, most of that story is found along a static front in the “war
of patrols” that dragged on during the years of peace talks after the UN decided it was
satisfied that it had “defeated North Korean aggression, rather than the aggressor” and
the Chinese were satisfied their border was no longer in danger by mid-1951. During
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this next phase, the author informs us, Rockingham’s brigade dominated no-man’s-
land with a vigorous patrol program intended to provide early warning of enemy
action and to keep Chinese defences off-balance by mounting regular raids. By
meticulously detailing nearly every one of the patrols, Johnston can claim, without
challenge, that the patrols and raids conducted by the Special Force volunteers under
Rockingham were the epitome of military planning, discipline, aggressive leadership
and professionalism. Indeed, Johnston claims the skill and determination of the
Special Force “misfits” to do their jobs well stands in sharp contrast to the “spit-and-
polish” professionals who followed in the next rotation from May 1952 to May 1953.
When comparing the regular force 1st Battalions of the second rotation with the
Special Force units, Johnston finds the regulars come up short. He lays blame for this
at the feet of the second rotation’s regular army officers, especially Brigadier M.P.
“Pat” Bogert and his three battalion commanders. Johnston suggests the four were less
experienced and less driven than their Special Force predecessors and more interested
in polishing buttons and holding mess dinners than in maintaining an aggressive
defence. Johnston maintains “Contrary to the image of competence suggested in
Strange Battleground, the Canadian Brigade languished in mediocrity throughout
Brigadier Bogert’s year in command – much to the annoyance of at least some of the
Allies in the Commonwealth Division” (p. 256). In fairness, Johnston adds that
Canadian Army Headquarters was guilty of not affording the second rotation the same
opportunities for collective training that “Rocky’s Army” benefited from in the eight
months prior to its deployment.
The results Johnston describes – a deadly combination of unmotivated leaders and
poor training – are deeply disturbing. During the second rotation, the aggressive
Canadian patrolling program was sharply curtailed. Most of the 1st Battalions’ patrols
ventured only to listening posts a few hundred yards beyond their positions. These
were ineffective as the “standing patrols” always returned to the same locations using
the same routes that became known to increasingly aggressive Chinese patrols.
Moreover, the meticulous reconnaissance patrolling and planning conducted prior to
Special Force raids were not employed by the regulars, and this turned their few
attempts to carry the fight to the enemy’s side of no-man’s-land into disasters.
Johnston also contends that Bogert’s regulars suffered more casualties during their
rotation as a result of their passivity than Rockingham’s “misfits” lost during their
tour, in spite of the fact that the Special Force tour included the bitter battles of
Kap’yong and Chail-li. Losing of control of no-man’s-land not only made the smaller
number of regular force patrols easy prey for Chinese ambushes, it also enabled
Chinese troops to conduct the same kind of destructive raids on Canadian trench lines
that the Special Force routinely conducted on the enemy in the previous year.
Johnston writes that a “dugout mentality” prevailed during the second rotation,
with officers up and down the chain of command unwilling to leave the safety of their
bunkers to lead from the front as had been common practice under Rockingham,
Dextraze and Stone. He is hyper-critical of the “so-called professionals who either
failed to understand the keys to successful military operations or lacked the drive and
determination to carry them out”(p. 283). Johnston backs his attack on the official
history’s contention that the Canadian Brigade was a model of professionalism under
Bogert with the post-war testimony of Major Harry Pope, a company commander in
1st Battalion of the Royal 22e Regiment and a staunch critic of many of his colleagues
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– particularly his own battalion commander. More importantly, Johnston tests the
sanitized brigade War Diary which served as the basis for Strange Battleground
against individual patrol reports and other tactical-level sources that reflect a
deteriorating situation in front of the Canadian lines. Further evidence that a problem
existed was revealed when Brigadier J.V. Allard and the third rotation of newly-
recruited regulars took over in May 1953. Allard immediately recognized the
weakness of Canadian positions and patrolling methods and took steps to correct
them.
Hidden somewhat in the shadow of his assault on the regular army is Johnston’s
analysis of external circumstances contributing to this dark chapter in Canadian
military history. Most importantly, the transfer between the first and second rotations
in the 25th Canadian Brigade coincided with significant efforts to rebuild and
reinforce the Chinese army in Korea after the disastrous losses suffered during failed
offensives in 1950-51 and UN counter-attacks. In the aftermath of these events, many
Special Force patrols encountered an enemy desperate for breathing space and
uninterested in holding a front too closely to UN positions, especially given the vast
disparity in firepower between the two sides. This began to change just before
Rockingham handed over command to Bogert. The regulars, in turn, faced a Chinese
opponent that grew more powerful by the month in artillery, mortars, machine-guns,
field fortifications and knowledge of how to conduct a successful, protracted defence.
Unfortunately for the 1st Battalions, increases in Chinese combat power occurred
at a time when the only news from Korea concerned peace negotiations. This had the
combined morale-sapping effect of curtailing Canadian public interest in the fighting
while convincing many regular soldiers there was no point risking their lives when
they expected the negotiations to conclude any day. This no doubt exacerbated the
problem arising from the leadership of Bogert and his three battlion commanders.
The author goes to great lengths establishing Rockingham’s reputation and skill,
including adding an introductory chapter on his conduct in Normandy. Johnston also
carefully examines the decision-making process inside “Rocky’s” brigade
headquarters in Korea and his success in working with the battalions under his
command. To a lesser extent, the same is done for Allard in the third rotation.
Johnston does not afford Bogert the same type of analysis. A brief biographical
paragraph suggests his command experience was brief and highlighted only by the
“Boforce” taskforce operation in Southern Italy and equally brief periods leading
brigades in the north. Most of his wartime career was spent as a staff officer. What is
missing, though, from Johnston’s analysis is that Bogert brilliantly led the West Nova
Scotia Regiment through the lonely Dittaino Valley battles in Sicily and that
“Boforce” succeeded in its critical mission during the Battle of Salerno through the
leadership and drive of Bogert, which is spoken of to this day in legion halls around
western Nova Scotia.11 Bogert also led brigades at San Fortunato and in the battles for
the northern Italian rivers during the bloodiest and most demoralizing fighting of the
entire Italian campaign. In addition, he served as senior staff officer in 1st Canadian
Infantry Division after its strength-sapping winter of patrolling on the Ortona front
11 Lee A. Windsor, “Boforce: 1st Canadian Infantry Division Operations in Support of the Salerno
Bridgehead”, Canadian Military History, 4, 2 (Autumn 1995), pp.  51-60.
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and he played a key role in rebuilding the formation for its great victories against the
Hitler and Gothic lines. Indeed, Pat Bogert was no stranger to the problem of finding
ways to motivate men in difficult situations, which makes his tenure of command in
Korea doubly tragic and puzzling.
The question of Bogert’s leadership may merit further investigation; nonetheless,
A War of Patrols is still the most comprehensive and balanced history of the Canadian
army in the Korean War. While operational level maps are scarce, the book is well
supplied with excellent tactical maps and oblique air photographs which, along with
author’s vivid description and discussion, illustrates the unique terrain problem
presented by the Korean landscape. This careful emphasis on terrain is another
hallmark of the third wave of Canadian military history.
The Canadian army of today was significantly shaped by its experience in Korea.
Indeed, the multi-battalion regular regiments, the integration of armoured units into
infantry brigades and even the establishment of a second light machine-gun in every
rifle section were all either lessons from Korea or expediencies forced on the shrunken
regular army in its first postwar commitment. These are among the most interesting
of Johnston’s conclusions. The similarities between the Korean War and the ongoing,
high-intensity peace-support operations of the last thirteen years are thought-
provoking. Like the Korean deployment, these operations are conducted by small
bands of professional soldiers projecting the national interest with the barest measure
of government and public knowledge or support. On this matter there is complete
consensus in all histories of the Canadian army in Korea, including Wood, Bercuson
and Watson. The question is essential for understanding how Canada’s citizen army,
known and loved by the nation in two world wars, evolved into the forlorn regulars of
the post-war period, condemned to risk life and limb around the world on a routine
basis with little notice paid to them by their nation – at least until 11 September 2001
once again reminded Canadians that they needed their men and women in uniform.
The theme linking these three works is that the Canadian official histories of the
nation’s ground forces in the Great War, the Second World War and Korea are in need
of expansion and revision. However, the case against them can be overstated.  The
official histories all embody the high standards of scholarly professionalism and
research rigour found in C.P. Stacey’s Historical Section of the Canadian Army
General Staff. The work of Stacey and his team continues to provide the basic
narrative structure for understanding this chapter of Canadian history. Nevertheless,
new sources, new social and cultural approaches and the new perspective now
possible in a post-Cold War world means the official battle narrative is no longer the
last word on the history of the Canadian army in combat. Just as importantly, the
revelations of the third wave of Canadian military history prove that, when properly
integrated with the full range of research and methodological tools available, narrative
history still has utility.
LEE WINDSOR
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